<table>
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<th>Motion</th>
<th>What does it mean?</th>
<th>Is it negotiable with the EU?</th>
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<td>L: Revocation to avoid No Deal (Joanna Cherry)</td>
<td>If no deal has been approved with two days to go before the end of the Article 50 period, the House will have a vote on whether to revoke Article 50 or leave with No Deal.</td>
<td>N/A – revocation can be done unilaterally.</td>
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<td>M: Confirmatory public vote (Margaret Beckett)</td>
<td>The House will not approve implementation of any Brexit deal unless and until it has been approved by the people in a confirmatory referendum.</td>
<td>Probably.</td>
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<td>D: Common Market 2.0 (Nick Boles)</td>
<td>Renegotiate the Political Declaration towards a ‘Norway Plus’ style relationship with the EU.</td>
<td>Possibly.</td>
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<td>Under this plan, at the end of the transition, the UK would:</td>
<td>The Withdrawal Agreement would be left intact, and the EU has said repeatedly that it is open to a future relationship along the lines of ‘Norway Plus.’</td>
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| K: Labour’s alternative plan (Jeremy Corbyn) | Renegotiate the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration to secure:  
- A permanent customs union with the EU  
- Close alignment with the single market, including “shared institutions”  
- Dynamic alignment on rights  
- Commitments to participate in EU agencies  
- Agreement on the detail of future security arrangements.  
Primary legislation to be introduced to enshrine these objectives in statute. | Partly.  
The motion calls to renegotiate both the Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration – and the EU will not reopen the Withdrawal Agreement. However, none of these objectives would actually require the Withdrawal Agreement to be reopened.  
Some of these objectives, such as a customs union, could be easily agreed in the Political Declaration.  
Others, such as an agreed security relationship – including access to the European Arrest Warrant – are not negotiable. |
| J: Customs Union (Ken Clarke) | Any Withdrawal Agreement and Political Declaration must include a commitment to negotiate a permanent UK-EU customs union.  
Enshrine this objective in primary legislation. | Probably.  
The Withdrawal Agreement backstop already contains a customs union. A commitment to negotiate a permanent customs union could be added to the Political Declaration, though the detail would need to be thrashed out. |
| H: EFTA and EEA (George Eustice) | Assert the UK’s “existing rights” to remain in the European Economic Area (EEA) and then apply to rejoin EFTA.  
Unlike Common Market 2.0, this would not include a customs union. Instead, it would seek agreement on new protocols relating to the Northern Ireland border and agri-food trade. | Very unlikely.  
This option seems to suggest amending the backstop (“new protocols”), which appears to be in conflict with the customs provisions of the backstop. If so, this is not possible at this stage.  
Legal opinion is also disputed as to whether the UK can automatically remain in the EEA after Brexit. |
| O: Contingent preferential arrangements (Marcus Fysh) | Aim to agree a ‘No Deal transition’ with the EU, including:  
- A zero-tariff free trade agreement  
- A two-year standstill period of mutual recognition of standards  
- A customs arrangement consisting of trade facilitation measures  
- Pay the EU the UK’s net contribution to the EU budget for two years | No.  
The UK can ask for these agreements in the event of No Deal, but the EU has repeatedly said that there will be no “deals” in a No Deal scenario and no “No Deal transition.” |
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<td>B: No Deal (John Baron)</td>
<td>Leave on 12 April with No Deal.</td>
<td>N/A – “No Deal,” by definition, does not need to be negotiated.</td>
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